The standard propositional exposition of necessary and sufficient conditions, as available in introductory logic texts, leads to a contradiction. It should be abolished.
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, (Layman 2002: 250-251) , (Leblanc and Wisdom 1976: 16-18) , (Salmon 1984: 47-48) , (P. Smith 2003: 132) , (Suppes 1957: 8-10) and (Watson and Arp 2015: 149) . The exposition goes along the following lines:
• "A is sufficient for B" is best rendered as "if A, then B", or symbolically, (A ⊃ B).
• "A is necessary for B" is best rendered as "if not A, then not B", or symbolically, (¬A ⊃ ¬B). This is equivalent to (B ⊃ A).
We can then combine these to obtain "A is necessary and sufficient for B", viz. ((B ⊃ A) ∧ (A ⊃ B)). Using the material biconditional, it is seen that A is necessary and sufficient for B just when A if and only if B, or symbolically, (A ≡ B). This is all very good, even beautiful in its simplicity.
But now suppose, as any curious beginner might -and at some point, should -suggest, that we would like to see what "A is neither necessary nor sufficient for B" amounts to. Since this is equivalent to "A is not necessary for B" combined with "A is not sufficient for B", we obtain:
). But this is a contradiction.
Our novice does a little search on the internet to ascertain that it is perfectly all right for a proposition to be neither necessary nor sufficient for another. In other words, there is no contradiction in the notion of "being neither necessary nor sufficient". The following are titles of some scientific articles (these can be easily converted into a form so that "neither necessary nor sufficient" is flanked with propositions):
• Monocular symmetry is neither necessary nor sufficient for the dichoptic perception of bilateral symmetry.
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• Hydrogen peroxide from the oxidative burst is neither necessary nor sufficient for hypersensitive cell death induction […].
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• Basic fibroblast growth factor is neither necessary nor sufficient for the development of retinal neovascularization.
4
In conclusion, one may demand that the classical exposition of necessary and sufficient conditions be abolished from introductory textbooks, for it only confuses the beginner. It is wiser to postpone the study of these conditions to a more advanced medium which does justice to their complexity, e.g., one where a modal framework is on offer (Hardegree, in progress) . For starters, it is possible to deal with these conditions in first order logic, as reported in (N. Smith 2012: 181) . The catch is to see A and B as one-place predicates, not as propositions. Thus, N. Smith says that "A is a sufficient condition for B" means that having the property A is enough for something to have the property B and should be rendered ∀x(Ax ⊃ Bx). Likewise "A is a necessary condition for B" means that something cannot possess the property B if it does not possess the property A and should be rendered ∀x(Bx ⊃ Ax). Then "A is neither sufficient nor necessary for B" comes out as ¬(∀x(Ax ⊃ Bx) v ∀x(Bx ⊃ Ax)) which is not a contradiction.
